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Abstract 
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) can compromise reliability performance of safety related 
systems and hence configurations with identical redundant units receive special attention in 
many industries, including in automotive, aviation and process applications. This paper 
introduces a new reliability model for redundant safety related systems using Markov analysis 
technique. The proposed model entails process demand in conjunction with CCF and established 
system failure modes such as dangerous undetected failures for the first time and evaluates their 
impact on the reliability performance of the system. The reliability of the safety related systems 
is measured using the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for low demand systems. The 
safety performance of the system is also appraised using Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF) to 
quantify the frequency of system entering a hazardous state that will lead to an accident if the 
situation is not controlled accordingly. The accuracy of the proposed Markov model is verified 
for a case study of flammable liquid storage tank overpressure protection system. It is 
demonstrated that the proposed approach provides sufficiently robust results for all demand 
rates, demand durations, dangerous undetected and CCF frequencies and associated repair rates 
for redundant safety related systems utilised in low demand mode of operation. 
Keywords: Markov chains; safety instrumented systems; safety related systems, common cause 
failure; process demand; hazardous event frequency. 
1.0 Introduction 
In addition to quality, productivity and profitability, safety assessment is nowadays an integral 
part of the functional safety strategy of companies. In this regard the first step for minimising the 
level of risk is awareness and understanding the concept of hazard and layers of protection. A 
diverse range of Independent Protection Layers (IPL) is increasingly used by the operators to 
protect from undesirable events. The IPLs can be applied in the form of administrative 
procedures or by physical barriers such as mechanical systems, and instrumented protective 
functions. The sequence of IPLs presented by the “onion model” [1, 2] starts from the centre and 
proceeds outwards, first with layers contributing towards reducing frequency of hazardous events 
and then with layers mitigating consequences of accidents [3]. An Electrical, Electronic and 
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Programmable Electronic System (E/E/PES) such as a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) can be 
used as an IPL in both capacities. Its goal is to provide protective functions by detecting 
abnormal conditions, performing the required safety action and maintaining the safe status of the 
system. 
 
The international standard IEC 61508 [4] can now be considered as the primary standard for the 
specification and the design validation, and verification of the safety function realised by an 
E/E/PES safety related system throughout all phases of its lifecycle. Its introduction in 1998 [4] 
has induced many companies to understand the new concepts in evaluation and the influence of 
all parameters in the SIS performance assessment. The principles introduced in the generic 
standard are also adapted for specific applications, such as IEC 61511 [1] for the process 
industry, IEC 62425 [5] for the railway industry, and ISO/DIS 26262 [6] for the automobile 
industry. The sectorial variation for the international standard for the process industry, IEC 
61511 [1], is intended for the practicing engineers and users of safety instrumented systems in 
upstream and downstream process industries. 
 
It is essential to analyse the sequence of IPL activation in the reliability performance 
quantification. Where a SIS is the last layer of protection utilised to mitigate the consequences of 
a hazardous event, then the failure of SIS may directly lead to an accident. IEC 61508 [4] 
stipulates that the performance of a SIS shall be proven using a suitable technique. This 
performance is the unavailability of the SIS to fulfil the required safety function and its 
confidence which is defined by the well-known Safety Integrity Level (SIL) [7] via computation 
of probabilistic parameters recognised as Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD). Some of the 
modelling techniques are cited in the appendices of international standards, although no specific 
approach is proposed. The most frequently used techniques to analyse the reliability of SIS 
include Simplified Equation (SE) [4, 8], Bayesian methods [9], Reliability Block Diagram 
(RBD) [10, 11], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [12, 13], Markov Analysis (MA) [14–16] and Petri 
Nets (PN) [7]. These diverse techniques have their own advantages and limitations. Each of these 
techniques may cover several aspects of the system behaviour concerning safety. Although 
individual aspects of the system’s risk related behaviour may be thoroughly analysed by some of 
the techniques, they do not always lead to identical results. 
 Page 4 
R
eliab
ility
 A
n
aly
sis o
f S
afety
 In
stru
m
en
ted
 S
y
stem
s S
u
b
ject to
 P
ro
cess D
em
an
d
 
F
irst Y
ear R
ep
o
rt 
Rouvroye and Brombacher [17] carried out a thorough comparison of reliability modelling 
techniques and established that Markov chain based reliability analysis covers most aspects for 
quantitative safety evaluation. Additionally, the performance of different reliability modelling 
techniques explored by Innal [18] concluded that Markov methods are the most suitable 
approach predominantly due to their flexibility. Guo and Yang [10] also emphasised that Markov 
analysis evinces more flexibility in contrast to other reliability modelling tools and is the only 
technique that can describe different states of a system and the dynamic transitions amongst 
these states. In recent years, several Markov models were developed that integrate the dynamic 
behaviour of SIS and the effect of demand inflicted on the safety instrumented system. A simple 
Markov chain of SIS subject to demand was first presented by Bukowski [15] which comprised 
of both dangerous detected and undetected failures. The preliminary model of Bukowski [15] 
was further elaborated by Jin et al. [3], incorporating the repair rate of dangerous undetected 
failures for safety instrumented system in conjunction with inclusion of safe failure and 
associated repair rate. In discrete attempts, Liu et al. [19], and, Alizadeh and Sriramula [20] 
extended the boundaries of Markov analysis and produced transition diagrams for a redundant 
configuration, however the impact of common cause failures were overlooked by exclusion. In 
this paper we intend to resolve the limitation of the model introduced by Liu et al. [19] by 
embedding CCFs in conjunction with established component failures for redundant 
configurations subject to demand. Therefore, this model is considered as one step closer to 
evaluating authentic behaviour of the redundant configurations since CCFs influence reliability 
and safety performance of the safety related systems and cannot be omitted in generic or specific 
case SRS architectures. 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to propose an exclusive Markov model to evaluate the 
reliability performance of redundant Safety Related Systems (SRSs) subject to demand which 
combines the effect of both dangerous undetected and common cause failures. The model 
introduced by Liu et al. [19] is developed further by using Markov chains for their ability to 
model accurately and correctly redundant safety related systems in low demand. The newly 
introduced reliability model is flexible to accommodate diverse repair strategies of redundant 
configurations. The multiple stage repair strategy of CCF for redundant safety systems has been 
studied by Alizadeh and Sriramula [21] whereas in this paper, an alternative strategy comprising 
single stage repair of CCF for redundant SRSs is considered. The proposed new model also 
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incorporates the following parameters: dangerous undetected failures, common cause failure and 
repair rates, demand rate and demand reset rate but assumes the absence of automatic diagnostics 
and proof test coverage. In the next Section the basics of safety instrumented systems are 
presented. In Section 3 we recall the mathematical preliminaries and fundamental elements of 
reliability modelling. Section 4 is devoted to the Markov models of simple and redundant safety 
related systems followed by a numerical analysis presented in Section 5. Applications of the 
proposed model are also discussed in Section 5 based on the results obtained, and concluding 
remarks are outlined at the end of this section. 
2.0 Safety Instrumented Systems 
2.1 Overview 
The primary objective of a SIS is to bring the equipment it oversees in a safe position when the 
Equipment Under Control (EUC) deviates from its design intent and results in an unwanted 
consequence (e.g. loss of containment leading to explosion, fire, etc.). SISs are widely used to 
prevent occurrence of hazardous events, and/or to mitigate their undesirable consequences to 
humans, the environment and financial assets. 
 
A SIS is functionally split into three main subsystems: (1) a Sensor Element (SE) to detect 
abnormal situations; (2) a Logic Solver (LS) to process and initiate an executive action based on 
a predefined logic and; (3) a Final Element (FE) to respond to the detected abnormal situation 
[4]. Redundant configurations are often used to enhance the reliability of SISs, hence each 
subsystem may consist of one or more (usually but not always) identical channels. In this regard, 
a SIS (or SIS subsystem) is known to have a koon configuration when k components of its total n 
components must operate to provide the required system function. Classic SIS configurations 
consist of 1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo3, and 2oo3 architectures [18]. In this article, only the two first 
configurations are studied, a 1oo1 system and a 1oo2 redundant configuration. This is because 
we believe that the main features of our new model will be demonstrated by these simple 
systems with reasonable amount of nodes and volume of the transitions, in comparison to 
configurations with higher level of redundancies. Furthermore, the aforementioned systems have 
been thoroughly assessed with other approaches [4, 21] therefore enabling comparison. 
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It is worth noting that a SIS may perform more than one Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) to 
achieve a safe state for the EUC including the system the SIS is protecting against a specific 
process demand [11]. The reliability analysis is always conducted with respect to one specific 
SIF, as it is the SIF that provides protective function against a specific hazardous scenario. 
Nevertheless, majority of publications in the literature refer to reliability of SIS, and we use this 
expression consistently even though what we essentially refer to is one SIF. In this article, the 
reliability modelling is presented for a single subsystem of identical elements, but it is relatively 
effortless to extend the computation to the entire SIF. 
2.2 Demand Modes 
IEC 61508 / 61511 distinguish between SISs in low demand, high demand and continuous mode 
of operations, where the borderline between low demand and high / continuous demand mode is 
the demand rate of once per year. This distinction is made based on two criteria consisting of the 
frequency at which the SIS is anticipated to operate in response to demands, and the expected 
time interval that a failure may remain undetected, considering the frequency of proof test. IEC 
61511 [1] distinguishes between two modes of operation namely demanded mode and 
continuous mode. SISs operating in demanded mode are mainly reactive barriers, whereas SIFs 
operating in continuous mode are mainly considered as proactive barriers [23], see Figure 1. 
Most attention in the process industry has been paid towards demanded SIFs and in specific SIFs 
in low demand mode. This is reflected in the available publications where the vast majority 
investigated reliability of low demand SIFs [3,6,11,16,19,24–28]. The international standards 
also focus predominantly on demanded SIFs with the main focus on the low demand mode of 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Bowtie Diagram with Proactive & Reactive Safety Barriers for Hazardous Events 
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The demand rate for a SIS may fluctuate from infrequent to continuous and the duration of each 
demand may vary from instantaneous up to a relatively lengthy period (e.g. hours). High demand 
systems are different from low demand systems, and the same analytical evaluation techniques 
cannot be implemented for all systems in different modes of operations. Techniques based on 
RBD and FTA are generally not appropriate for assessment of high demand SISs when the 
duration of demands is also substantial. Several authors have indicated that Markov methods are 
best suited for analysing SISs operational in both high and low demand systems [19]. 
 
Despite the seemingly clear split between the low demand and high demand mode of operations, 
there are still some underlying issues that result in confusion and complications in the 
quantification of SIS reliability performance [3]: 
(1) neither in IEC 61508 nor in or any other reliable sources the rationale behind using once per 
year or twice the frequency of functional tests as the borderline is fully justified [25]. 
(2) the various elements may have different demand rates for some SISs. It is not uncommon that 
parts of the logic solver may, be commonly used between various SIFs and hence can be 
operated more often than the initiator and/or final elements, making it difficult to determine the 
exact mode of operation. 
(3) the demand mode classification discards the criticality of demand duration. In some rare 
applications, once the demand takes place, it may generate “sub-demands” during an extended 
period of time. The SIS may therefore be in the low demand mode between demands, and in the 
high demand mode while responding to the demand due to its duration. A classic example of 
SISs in these applications is a Blow-Out Preventer (BOP) that is employed to stop uncontrolled 
flow from oil and gas wells during drilling. Situations that require full closure of the BOP are 
very infrequent, however when the BOP is activated, it must be able to withstand the full well 
pressure for hours or even weeks. 
 
Neither the demand mode classification nor the proposed reliability performance measures for 
low and high demand systems, can resolve these issues. As such, rather than establishing a clear 
borderline between different modes of operation, some authors suggest to incorporate the rate of 
demands into the analysis by using Markov modelling [13, 24, 28]. 
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2.3 Failure on Demand & Integrity Levels 
The basis of the international standards IEC 61508 / 61511 is the establishment of the safety 
lifecycle and the introduction of Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The standard stipulates that every 
safety function shall achieve a specific SIL, determined based on a suitable risk assessment. The 
SIL is a quantitative index that specifies the acceptable probability of dangerous failure that a 
SIS can retain to be considered as an appropriate IPL for a given safety integrity requirement. 
Distinction is made in SIL criteria between two different types of operations, the average 
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for low demand mode of operations and the Probability 
of Failure per Hour (PFH) for high demand systems. The aim of PFD and PFH is to maintain the 
residual risk at an acceptable level [30]. The IEC 61508 standard [4] outlines four classifications 
of integrity levels based on the PFD and/or PFH as shown in Table 1 where SIL 4 corresponds to 
the highest and SIL 1 to the lowest integrity level requirements: 
Table 1 – Definition of SIL Levels  
SIL 1 2 3 4 
𝑃𝐹𝐷  [10−2, 10−1) [10−3, 10−2) [10−4, 10−3) [10−5, 10−4) 
𝑃𝐹𝐻  [10−6, 10−5) [10−7, 10−6) [10−8, 10−7) [10−9, 10−8) 
 
The SIS design entails achievement of minimum levels of safety integrity as necessitated by the 
standard. The safety integrity requirements include the restriction of the system PFD to a 
maximum target limit in conjunction with the compliance with minimum levels of Hardware 
Fault Tolerance (HFT). Therefore, in addition to the requirement of PFD, the highest SIL that 
can be claimed for a subsystem’s combination of hardware is limited by architectural constraints, 
which are detailed in IEC 61508. The overall value of average probability of failure on demand 
of a SIS (𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑆) is calculated using the PFD values of one or more of input elements, logic 
solvers and final elements [28, 30], therefore the weak link prevails in all cases as follows: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑆 = ∑𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑆𝐸 + ∑𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐿𝑆 + ∑𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐹𝐸  (1) 
 
The context of PFD and PFH is studied by various authors and a common measure for use with 
both demand modes (low and high) is recommended. This includes incorporation of the rate of 
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demands into the analysis [13, 15, 24] instead of drawing a clear borderline between low and 
high demand mode of operation. Misumi and Sato [13] utilise fault tree analysis technique to 
develop analytical formulas for a newly introduced “hazardous event frequency”, whereas 
Bukowski [15] computes the probability of being in a state of “fail dangerous and process 
requires shutdown” (PFDPRS) based on a Markov chain. Although these proposals are 
promising in quantification of SIS reliability performance in general, further development is 
needed to reflect all pertinent modelling aspects. In this paper we use both the PFD and 
Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF) as performance indicators of the reliability model proposed 
for redundant safety related systems subject to demand mode. 
3.0 Modelling Fundamentals 
3.1 Component Failure Modes 
Safety instrumented systems are exposed to two main types of failures; those that prevent the 
execution of the SIF, normally referred to as dangerous failure, and those that do not, which are 
called safe failures [4]. Dangerous failures represented by 𝜆𝐷 are characterised as failures which 
cause the system to fail dangerous, e.g. the component does not operate on demand. Safe failures 
denoted by 𝜆𝑆 are characterised by a spurious alarm or trip which causes the system to fail safe, 
e.g. the component operates without demand [32]. Spurious activations should be avoided during 
SIS design, and if a spurious activation occurs, it should bring the EUC to a safe state and 
maintain accordingly. Safe failures do not have any effect on the ability of the SIS to perform its 
functions. 
 
The overall failure rate of a component 𝜆 is obtained by 𝜆 = 𝜆𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆. In this paper both safe and 
dangerous failures are included within the proposed reliability models of safety instrumented 
systems. Each of these two categories is further split into detected failures and undetected 
failures. Detected failures are revealed by diagnostic testing, whereas undetected failures are 
only revealed by proof testing or during the solicitation by the EUC. Dividing the dangerous and 
safe failures into detected and undetected, four distinct failures can be distinguished. These 
failure modes comprised of Dangerous Detected (DD), Dangerous Undetected (DU), Safe 
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Detected (SD) and Safe Undetected (SU). The overall component failure rate consists of the 
summation of these four main elements: 
 
𝜆 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝑈 (2) 
 
where 𝜆𝐷𝐷 represents DD failure rate, 𝜆𝐷𝑈 is DU failure rate, 𝜆𝑆𝑈 denotes SU failure rate and 𝜆𝑆𝐷 
signifies the SD failure rate. In order to model SIS reliability, it is vital to recognise the nature of 
the failure modes and means of their detection. This would allow the development of appropriate 
strategies to ensure the required functionality, reliability and availability of safety instrumented 
functions are retained as specified in accordance with IEC 61508 [4]. 
3.2 Testing Strategies & Failure Detection 
A SIS is an active IPL system that is triggered only when a demand is inflicted. Failures may 
therefore occur and remain hidden until the system is demanded or tested. Here, we briefly 
mention the two main categories of testing strategies for detection of failures. 
3.2.1 Diagnostic Testing 
Diagnostic testing can detect the dangerous failures without fully discharging the main function 
of the safety instrumented system and interrupting the EUC. For instance, the diagnostic testing 
may reveal drifting in the signal conversion of a transmitter without activating the instrument 
device. Diagnostic testing is provided from time to time by the manufacturer as a feature of 
programmable electronic components. The interval between consecutive diagnostic tests is called 
diagnostic test interval which is usually short, ranging from milliseconds to hours in extreme 
scenarios. This allows sufficient time to execute repair activities for low demand SISs and 
restore the component function prior to the next demand. 
 
The fraction of dangerous failures that can be detected by diagnostic tests is known as Diagnostic 
Coverage (DC) [4]. The DC can be estimated using a Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
at the component level [32, 33]. The possible failures are then sought to determine if they can be 
detected by diagnostic testing. It is seldom evaluated whether such a testing leads to side-effects 
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[26]. The ratio of the detected dangerous failure to the total dangerous failures (detected and not 
detected) is defined by IEC 61508 as the DC rate and computed as [16]: 
 
𝐷𝐶 =
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
=
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈
 (3) 
 
The DC rate in Equation (3) characterises the effectiveness of the diagnostic testing. Although 
the diagnostic testing can reveal dangerous failure almost immediately when failure occurs, only 
a fraction of dangerous failures can be detected. This fraction of dangerous failures is recognised 
as DD failures, and the remaining failures are defined as DU failures which are only detected by 
proof testing. Hence, DC rate divides the dangerous and safe failures into detected and 
undetected, resulting in four discrete failure modes [35] as follows: 
 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝐷    𝜆𝐷𝑈 = (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝐷 
𝜆𝑆𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝑆    𝜆𝑆𝑈 = (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝑆 
(4) 
 
The total failure rate now can be revised as the following equation considering the estimated DC: 
 
𝜆 = 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝐷 + (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝐷 + 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝑆 + (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝑆 (5) 
 
Dangerous detected failures are often ignored in reliability analysis of safety instrumented 
systems since it is assumed that when a DD failure occurs, the EUC is brought to a safe state 
instantaneously. This assumption is not always fulfilled as the diagnostic test interval is not 
negligible always, meaning that a DD failure may not be detected immediately after its 
occurrence. Furthermore, switching to a safe state may not be feasible promptly after a revealed 
dangerous failure. The operational philosophy may sometimes allow the SIS to operate in a 
degraded mode [36]. The proposed reliability model in this paper is focused on DU failures and 
evaluates their impact on the performance of redundant safety instrumented systems. 
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3.2.2 Proof Testing 
Since the diagnostic testing is unable to detect all dangerous failures, proof tests are performed 
periodically to reveal the latent failures which prevent the SIS to fulfil its safety function if it is 
solicited. The proof test also facilitates evaluation of SIS performance and whether it reaches and 
preserves its allocated safety integrity level [37]. Thus, these tests are vitally important for the 
SIS as they enable operators to maintain and improve the safety integrity level without making 
design modifications [37]. Proof tests are in many cases performed at regular time intervals, 
although the frequency of such tests is considerably lower than for diagnostic tests and it may 
vary from months, up to years. Proof test duration is an important parameter for calculating the 
reliability of SIS. For safety instrumented systems operating in low demand modes, it is essential 
to perform proof testing to avoid a DU failure remaining hidden for a prolonged period of time. 
The necessity and value of proof testing for improving the reliability of a high demand SIS 
however is not always evident, as the likelihood of revealing a failure before a demand occurs is 
reduced. 
 
In many reliability analyses, the proof test is assumed to reveal all failures. This means that all 
the undetected failures can be detected and repaired; otherwise, undetected failures will be 
discovered with a certain probability and rectified upon detection of DU failures in a 
comprehensive system overhaul before a demand occurs. Perfect proof testing in practice is 
difficult to achieve even for a moderately complex SIS. There may be certain failures that remain 
hidden until a major overhaul, a real demand, or the end of the SIS lifetime. In this paper we 
assume that a thorough examination is carried out during the proof tests. Therefore, these tests 
are perfect in detection of the latent failures (100% success rate) and the system can be restored 
to “as good as new” condition or as close as possible to this circumstance [38]. A proof test may 
lead to partial process disturbance and hence it is associated with certain economic expenditure 
in addition to the cost of labour, materials and equipment required for completion of the testing. 
3.3 Common Cause Failures 
IEC 61508 pointed out the presence of CCFs for redundant configurations which can occur in 
channels following the same cause [21, 38]. The importance of CCFs in SIS performance 
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assessment is also documented in many papers e.g. Hokstad et al. [40] and Lundteigen et al. [31]. 
A CCF is a failure affecting several or all of the redundant components of a SIS simultaneously, 
leading to impairment of the safety function and ultimately SIS failure in response to a process 
demand. Consequently, CCFs must be identified during the design phase and their potential 
impact on the SIS functionality must be analysed and eradicated or reduced as far as reasonably 
practicable [30, 39]. 
 
The introduction of the common cause expression in reliability analysis affords the opportunity 
for evaluation of CCF and its impact on the failure probability of a SIS [35, 36]. In this regard, 
the PFD can be calculated taking cognisance of such CCFs by directly incorporating them into 
the SIS reliability model [41]. The computing parameters of CCF are usually evaluated using 
feedback data. However, considering the challenge in obtaining such data, parametric models 
have been developed. Various models have been introduced in the literature for evaluation of the 
CCF impact on the overall reliability of safety instrumented system including the 𝛽 factor model 
[39], the PDS method [22], the model of Multiple Greek Letters (MGL) [42], the α factor model 
[43], the Boundary model [32] and the system Cut-off model [32]. It is our understanding that a 
sole CCF data base initiative only exists in the nuclear industry [44–46]. Given the limitations in 
obtaining CCF data in the process industry in the absence of a sole database, the CCF model in 
this article is developed parametrically. 
 
In this paper we use the 𝛽 factor model for assessment of CCF as recommended by IEC 61508  
[11, 35]. The 𝛽 factor model is the most commonly used model due to its reasonable complexity 
which was initially introduced by Fleming [39]. The main assumption is that each component 
can fail because of: 
 Events that influence only the concerned component. The corresponding failure rates for 
these events called independents, are denoted by 𝜆𝐼. 
 Events that induce simultaneous failures of the system or subsystem components. The 
corresponding failure rates are known as common cause and noted by 𝜆𝐶. 
 
The 𝛽 factor model comprises of a fixed proportion of the failures arising from a common cause 
[32]. In this model 𝛽 is usually estimated by experts using the checklist approach [46, 47]. 
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Rahimi et al. [49] also discussed how human and organizational factors may influence CCF in 
SIS and outlined the challenges in assessing the 𝛽 factor. The factor 𝛽 is defined as the failure 
probability due to a common cause given the occurrence of a failure [30, 36] and is obtained by: 
 
𝛽 =  
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝑇
=
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐼 + 𝜆𝐶
 (6) 
 
An estimate of the value of 𝛽 is usually given by the experts to warrant a safety margin on the 
performance analysis results. A greater safety margin is expected with higher value, however, a 
reasonable selection is anticipated to compromise between safety and costs. The choice of 𝛽 
directly induces the values of common cause failure (𝜆𝐶) and independent failures (𝜆𝐼) as 
explained by the following relations: 
 
𝜆𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝑇    𝜆𝐶 = 𝛽𝜆𝑇 (7) 
 
where 𝜆𝑇 is the total failure rate of a component. In accordance with the 𝛽 factor model, the total 
failure rate of a component is the sum of common cause and independent failures [35]: 
 
𝜆𝑇 = 𝜆𝐼 + 𝜆𝐶 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝑇 + 𝛽𝜆𝑇 (8) 
 
Applying the ratio determined by the 𝛽 factor model above to total failure rate in Equation (2), 
the detected and undetected failure modes are segregated into independent and common cause 
failures. The total failure rate is therefore split into eight different contributions as follows: 
 
𝜆𝑇 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐼 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐼 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷
𝐼 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶 + 𝜆𝑆𝑈
𝐼 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶  (9) 
 
As the primary objective is to determine the PFD, only the dangerous failure of the components 
is considered. Hence, the CCF quantification for various rates of the detected and undetected 
dangerous failures becomes: 
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     𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽𝐷). 𝜆𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝛽𝐷). 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝐷 
     𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶 = 𝛽𝐷 . 𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝐷. 𝐷𝐶. 𝜆𝐷 
     𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽𝑈). 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = (1 − 𝛽𝑈). (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝐷 
     𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐶 = 𝛽𝑈. 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = 𝛽𝑈. (1 − 𝐷𝐶). 𝜆𝐷 
(10) 
 
where 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛽𝑈 respectively represent the proportion of detected and undetected common cause 
failures related to the DC rate [16]. The segregation of failure rates provides an opportunity for 
the design engineers/analysers to study general behaviour of the system, for instance to measure 
the probability of system operational with only one of the components in failed states which can 
be used as a risk based approach for prioritisation of maintenance backlog for SRSs. 
3.4 Inclusion of Repair Rates 
3.4.1 1oo1 System 
The system is subject to diagnostic testing as well as proof testing. The proof tests are carried out 
at regular time intervals of length 𝜏. For the dangerous failures detected via online diagnostic 
testing, the equipment downtime is equivalent to the actual repair duration. This assumes that the 
repair actions are instigated immediately after detection of the failure. Hence, the repair rate of 
dangerous detected failures, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, is computed directly from the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) 
as follows: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝐷 =
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 (11) 
 
The equipment downtime due to dangerous undetected failures is not solely limited to the repair 
duration as the failure has not been revealed by an online diagnostic test and is unknown until 
next proof test. The undetected failures can be revealed either by  
 solicitation of the equipment under control; 
 proof testing assuming these tests are comprehensive and perfectly accurate (i.e. 100% 
detection rate) in detecting latent failures. 
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Figure 2 – Undetected Dangerous Fault Down Time 
 
In the remaining part of this section we obtain the equipment downtime due to DU failures for a 
1oo1 system. The average downtime for undetected failures may be split into two elements, 
known downtime and unknown downtime. The equipment downtime due to completion of the 
repair activity is referred to as known downtime, assuming the remedial actions are commenced 
immediately after detection of the failure during proof testing. The unknown downtime implies 
the average portion of time between occurrence of an undetected failure and its discovery during 
the next proof test. The time to perform a proof test is excluded from average downtime as it is 
often negligible. Assuming that 𝑡𝑓 is the time when the average probability of failure for a DU 
fault in the interval of (0, 𝜏) occurs in a system [50], then the named equivalent Mean Down 
Time (MDT) for the DU fault in a channel is defined as per Figure 2 as follows: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑇 = 𝜏 − 𝑡𝑓 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (12) 
 
For a 1oo1 safety instrumented system the average time of failure for a DU fault is: 
 
𝑡𝑓 = (∫ 𝑡
𝜏
0
𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡) 𝐹𝑡(𝜏)⁄ = (∫ 𝑡𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡
𝜏
0
)𝑑𝑡) (∫ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡
𝜏
0
)𝑑𝑡)⁄  (13) 
 
where the probability of failure in the interval of (0, 𝜏) for the Exponential distribution is 
obtained from: 
 
𝑡~𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝜆𝐷𝑈) → 𝐹𝑡(𝜏) = 𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) = ∫ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡
𝜏
0
)𝑑𝑡 = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏) (14) 
𝑡𝑓  𝑡𝑑  𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
𝜏 
𝑀𝐷𝑇 
𝑇 
0 
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Considering 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏 ≪ 1 and taking into account that 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏) ≈ 1 − 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏, the average time 
of failure for a single channel SIS is 𝑡𝑓 ≈
𝜏
2⁄ . Where 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏 < 0.1, then 
𝜏
2⁄  is a sufficiently 
reasonable approximation to the real value of 𝑡𝑓. Therefore, Equation (12) can be written as: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑇1𝑜𝑜1 =
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (15) 
 
As such, the DU repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝑈, for an undetected failure can be calculated as: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 =
1
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 (16) 
 
Of the two contributing factors to the downtime of undetected failures, the unknown part is 
generally dominating the overall downtime of a component. The component DD and DU failure 
modes and associated repairs for a 1oo1 SIS are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – 1oo1 Architecture 
 
3.4.2 1oo2 System 
For a 1oo2 configuration the DD repair rate is identical to the single architecture and as such can 
be calculated by Equation (11). This is based on the availability of the diagnostic testing and 
instantaneous commencement of repair action upon detection of the failure. Similar to 1oo1 
simple configuration, undetected failures in a 1oo2 system can be revealed upon discharge of a 
demand or by conducting a proof test assuming precise testing results in detection of unrevealed 
failures. The MDT for a DU failure of a 1oo2 redundant architecture is derived in this section. 
The probability density function for undetectable fault in a redundant two component system is: 
 
 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 
 
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
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𝑓(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝜏|𝑁(𝑡𝑘) = 1). 𝑃(𝑁(𝑡𝑘) = 1)
2
𝑘=1
 (17) 
          = 2𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡)[1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡)] if   𝑡1 = 𝑡2 
 
The average probability of failure [50] for a redundant architecture is then obtained from: 
 
𝑡𝑓 = (∫ 𝑡
𝜏
0
𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡) 𝐹𝑡(𝜏)⁄ = (∫ 2𝑡𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡)[1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡)]
𝜏
0
𝑑𝑡) (18) 
     𝓏𝓏 (∫ 2𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡
𝜏
0
)[1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡)]𝑑𝑡)⁄  
 
Considering for 1oo2 architecture, the probability of failure for the undetectable fault is: 
 
𝐹𝑡(𝜏) = ∫ 2𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡
𝜏
0
)[1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 = [1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏)]
2 (19) 
 
Since 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏 ≪ 1 and 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏) ≈ 1 − 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏, the Equation (18) is then equivalent to: 
 
𝑡𝑓 ≈
2
3
𝜏 −
3
4
𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏
2 +
7
12
𝜆𝐷𝑈
2 𝜏3 − ⋯ (20) 
 
As 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏 < 0.1, then 
2
3
𝜏 is a good approximation to the real value of 𝑡𝑓. The equivalent MDT for 
an undetected failure of a 1oo2 redundant architecture is thus calculated by: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑇1𝑜𝑜2 = 𝜏 − 𝑡𝑓 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 =
𝜏
3⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (21) 
 
On this basis the DU repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝑈, can be obtained from: 
 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 =
1
𝜏
3⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 (22) 
 
In accordance with the Figure 4, the two channels and common cause component form a series 
system. It shall be noted that where CCF occurs, the system behaves like a single channel system 
and the mean down time of 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 and 𝜏 2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 are adequate representations for repair of 
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dangerous detected and undetected CCFs respectively. Considering the definitions of 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛽𝑈, 
the probability of failure for dangerous detected common cause failure [50] is 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 and 
the probability of failure for dangerous undetected common cause failure is acquired from 
𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈(
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – 1oo2 Architecture 
 
The repair rates for dangerous and common cause failures are embedded within the reliability 
model proposed in this paper in parametric form. The case study in section 5 however will take 
account of the repair rate values accordingly. 
3.5 Demand Parameters & System Renewal 
The process demands (PD) are assumed to occur according to a Homogeneous Poisson Process 
(HPP) [51] with rate 𝜆𝐷𝐸, hence the time between two consecutive demands is exponentially 
distributed with parameter 𝜆𝐷𝐸. 
 
𝑁𝑃𝐷~𝑃𝑂𝐼(𝜆𝐷𝐸) → 𝑇𝑃𝐷~𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝜆𝐷𝐸) (23) 
 
Assuming that the system is “as good as new” after a successful response to a process demand, 
the duration of each process demand (DD) is presumed to follow exponential distribution with 
the rate 𝜇𝐷𝐸. Hence, the mean demand duration is computed from: 
 
𝑇𝐷𝐷~𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝜇𝐷𝐸) → 𝐸(𝑡) =
1
𝜇𝐷𝐸⁄  (24) 
 
  
(1 − 𝛽𝑈). 𝜆𝐷𝑈 
 
𝜏
3⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 
(1 − 𝛽𝐷). 𝜆𝐷𝐷 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
  
Common Cause 
Failure 
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Moreover, when a hazardous event occurs, we assume that the system is restored / renewed to 
the normal available state. The system renewal (SR) rate is also considered to be exponentially 
distributed with rate 𝜇𝑇. 
 
𝑇𝑆𝑅~𝐸𝑋𝑃( 𝜇𝑇) → 𝐸(𝑡) =
1
 𝜇𝑇⁄  (25) 
3.6 Model Assumptions 
The following underlying assumptions are made as a basis for developing a new reliability model 
in this paper: 
 The time to failures are exponentially distributed (all failure rates are constant in time). 
 All safe and dangerous failures occur independently (separately) and their magnitudes are 
constant over time. 
 The redundant elements considered are identical and have the same constant failure rates. 
 The 𝛽 factor model is used to consider the CCFs; however, the reliability model can be 
easily extended to accommodate different CCF models. 
 The time between demands is exponentially distributed (process demand rate is constant). 
 The process demand duration and restoration time from hazardous state are exponentially 
distributed. 
 The rate of independent (ID) failures is segregated from the total failure rate, such that 
(1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈 is used instead of 𝜆𝐷𝑈 for independent DU failures. Subsequently CCF rates, 
𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈, leading to subsystem failure are clearly identified for redundant subsystems. 
 Proof tests are comprehensive (100% accurate) and carried out periodically in line with the 
specified test intervals of the system. 
 A single maintenance team is available on site. 
 The system can be considered “as good as new” upon completion of a repair or a proof test. 
3.7 Markov Chain based Reliability Model 
Reliability modelling using Markov chains is one of the techniques quoted in IEC 61511 [1]. 
Markov chains are a holistic approach frequently used in dependability analysis for modelling a 
repairable system where components fail at constant failure rate and are repaired at constant 
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restoration rates [16]. In this paper, the transition probabilities of Markov chain are considered 
independent of time and following the homogeneous process therefore, the failure / repair rates 
are considered constants. This assumption is consistent when working in the useful life period 
(maturity phase) of components. It is also possible to take into account some dependencies in 
Markov chains in order to perform a dynamic analysis of the system [19]. A Markov chain is a 
model that transits from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 with a probability 𝑝𝑖𝑗 which depends only on the states 𝑖 
and 𝑗. The transition matrix 𝑷 = [𝑝𝑖𝑗] be (𝑟 × 𝑟) constructed from all transition probabilities 𝑝𝑖𝑗: 
 
𝑷 = [𝑝𝑖𝑗] =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑝11
𝑝21
⋮
⋮
𝑝𝑟1
𝑝12
𝑝22
⋮
⋮
𝑝𝑟2
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋱
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋱
⋯
𝑝1𝑟
𝑝2𝑟
⋮
⋮
𝑝𝑟𝑟]
 
 
 
 
 (26) 
 
Assuming 𝑃(𝑡) = [𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃𝑟(𝑡)], where 𝑃𝑗(𝑡) represents the probability of finding the system 
in state 𝑗 at time 𝑡. The transition law of a Markov chain is defined by the following equation: 
 
[𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃𝑟(𝑡)] = [𝑃1(𝑡 − 1), … , 𝑃𝑟(𝑡 − 1)].
[
 
 
 
 
𝑝11
𝑝21
⋮
⋮
𝑝𝑟1
𝑝12
𝑝22
⋮
⋮
𝑝𝑟2
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋱
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋱
⋯
𝑝1𝑟
𝑝2𝑟
⋮
⋮
𝑝𝑟𝑟]
 
 
 
 
 (27) 
 
Equation (27) can be written in a compact form as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑃(𝑡). 𝑷 (28) 
 
Considering that 𝑷 is a probability matrix, the sum of each row of 𝑷 is one and all the 
coefficients 𝑝𝑖𝑗 are equal to or greater than zero. The probability of each state 𝑗 at each time 𝑡 is 
given by: 
 
𝑃𝑗(𝑡) = ∑𝑃𝑖(𝑡 − 1). 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑖
 (29) 
 
If 𝑃(0) = [𝑃1(0),… , 𝑃𝑟(0)], where 𝑃𝑗(0) is the probability of being initially in state 𝑗. The 
Chapman-Kolmogorov formula [11] is obtained from Equation (28) as follow: 
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𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑃(0). 𝑷𝑡 (30) 
 
A property of regular Markov chains is that powers of 𝑷 converge to a vector of probabilities 𝚷. 
The vector 𝚷 = [𝜋1, … , 𝜋𝑟] represents the steady state probabilities and can be determined by 
solving the following linear system [11]: 
 
𝚷.𝑷 = 𝚷 (31) 
 
The steady state probability for state 𝑖, 𝜋𝑖, is the long-run probability that the system is in state 𝑖. 
It also signifies the mean proportion of time the system is in state 𝑖 [3] and the fact that the sum 
of the steady state probabilities is always equal to 1. 
 
∑𝜋𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1
= 1 (32) 
 
The unavailability of the safety system is computed by summing the probabilities of being in 
states 𝑗 at each time 𝑡, according to Equation (33) where 𝑗 corresponds to the states that the 
safety system is not able to respond on demand: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 = ∑𝜋𝑗
𝑗
 (33) 
 
In a Markov model, the frequency of entering a hazardous state can be acquired directly from the 
transition diagram. The system transits to the hazardous state when a demand is inflicted on it 
whilst the SIS is failed dangerously either detected or undetected. The hazardous event frequency 
(HEF) is equal to the visit frequency to state 0, from any other possible states [11]: 
 
𝐻𝐸𝐹 = ∑𝑞𝑖0
𝑟
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖  where 𝑞𝑖𝑗 =
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = lim
t→0
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑡
 (34) 
 
In this article, we aim to investigate the reliability performance of safety related systems where 
redundancy in components is embedded within the architectural design of the system. This 
considers the demand rate and duration of demand for safety related systems operating in various 
demand modes. A generic framework for reliability assessment of redundant safety instrumented 
systems subject to demand using Markov chains is illustrated in Figure 5. This framework 
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outlines steps required for completion of the reliability assessment including SIS definition, 
demand analysis, component failure and repair data, test strategies and lastly the implementation 
of the safety instrumented systems. Additionally, the reliability assessment framework can be 
used in conjunction with the safety lifecycle plan as outlined by the international standard IEC 
61508 and can be applied to all E/E/PES safety related systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Framework for Reliability Assessment for Redundant Safety Instrumented Systems Subject to Demand 
 
Various studies [3, 16] have considered PFD as steady state unavailability using Markov 
methodology whereas others as average value of unavailability in line with IEC 61508 [1]. 
Nevertheless, the authors acknowledge that the steady state unavailability computed in this paper 
is not the same as, nor equivalent to the PFDavg required for SIL verification in IEC 61508 and 
IEC 61511. However, when using the models presented, the calculated steady state unavailability 
is greater than the PFDavg defined in IEC 61508/61511 that would have been computed from the 
same models. The steady state unavailability is therefore conservative and considered an 
acceptable substitute for PFDavg. 
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4.0 Analysis of Safety Related Systems 
4.1 Markov Model for 1oo1 SRS 
A Markov model for a simple 1oo1 safety instrumented system was originally developed by 
Rausand & Høyland [11]. The application of this model is reviewed in this paper for a simple 
safety related system, a Pressure Relief Valve (PRV). It should be noted that PRVs are normally 
considered as mechanical devices and are not categorised as a safety instrumented system since 
the two primary elements of SIS including sensor / transmitter and logic solver elements of the 
system do not exist. However, considering PRV as the final element of a SIS, the Markov model 
developed for SIS can be simplified to represent the failures modes of mechanical safety devices 
such as a PRV. In other words, the 1oo1 PRV is an exceptional case of generic SIS model with 
process demand incorporated. The primary dangerous failure mode for a PRV is “fail to open” 
on demand. In accordance with PDS Data Handbook [52] the DD failure rate for a PRV is 0 and 
hence only DU failure rate is incorporated within the model. The dynamic of SRS consists of the 
combined characteristics of the system state and demand levied on the safety system. A safety 
related system is defined as “available” when it can respond to a demand upon manifestation. 
This means that the safety related system is not failed due to DU failure and has not been 
spuriously activated. The SRS is considered in “functioning” state when it is reacting to a 
process demand. The possible states of the system are outlined in Table 2. 
Table 2 – States of 1oo1 SRS 
System State Property Demand State 
0 Hazardous On Demand 
1 Available No Demand 
2 Functional On Demand 
3 DU Failure No Demand 
4 Safe Failure No Demand 
 
State 1 denotes the initial and normal operating state in the Markov transition diagram, where the 
safety system is available but there is no demand for activation of the safety function. The safe 
state (e.g. spurious activation) is represented by state 4 indicating that the EUC is safe regardless 
of whether there is a demand or not and hence no hazardous event can occur at this stage. Safe 
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failure modes of PRV comprised of “spurious operation”, “fail to close” and “leakage in closed 
position”. The transitions between states 1 and 4 are due to safe failure and restoration. The safe 
state 4 is incorporated for modelling purpose however it is noted that the system PFD is 
characterised by dangerous failures only. State 2 represents the functioning state where the SRS 
is responding to a process demand. Upon removal of the process demand the safety system goes 
back to state 1. The system transits to state 3 from state 1 due to DU failure while there is no 
process demand levied on the SRS. Repair of the DU failure will lead to system transition to the 
available state by the corresponding repair rate 𝜇𝐷𝑈. State 0 (hazardous state) represents a state 
where the SRS sustains a failure and there is a demand for activation of the SRS. The system 
enters hazardous state 0 from state 2 when the safety system is impaired due to a DU failure as it 
is responding to a process demand. Alternatively, the hazardous state 0 is reached from state 3 if 
a process demand is imposed on the SRS whilst it is in failed state. The Markov transition 
diagram is illustrated in Figure 6 where arrows represent system transition from one state to 
another and the nodes correspond to the systems states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Markov Transition Diagram for a 1oo1 SRS 
A restoration action is initiated, when system enters the hazardous state (state 0) and the system 
is started up again in an “as good as new condition” in state 1. The mean time required to restore 
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the system from state 0 to state 1 is 1 𝜇𝑇⁄  as per Equation (25). The relevance of this assumption 
may differ and for some applications start up after a hazardous event may not be feasible. In a 
worst credible event scenario, the entire system and/or plant may be demolished due to the 
consequence of the hazardous event. However, the restoration rate from hazardous state is an 
essential element of the Markov model since it eliminates absorbing state (state 0) and enables 
calculation of the steady state probabilities. To avoid this problem, we may instead consider the 
hazardous state(s) as absorbing state(s), and calculate the mean time from start-up in perfect state 
until a hazardous state takes place [11]. The steady state equations from the state transition 
diagram in Figure 6 for 1oo1 SRS can be obtained from: 
 
𝜇𝑇𝑃0 = (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃2 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃3) 
(𝜇𝐷𝐸 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃2 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃1 
(𝜇𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸)𝑃3 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃1 
𝜆𝑆𝑃1 = 𝜇𝑆𝑃4 
(35) 
 
The sum of steady state probabilities is unity considering that the system will be in one of the 
states in infinity, ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 0,… ,4. 
4.2 Markov Model for 1oo2 SRS 
A classic formation of safety related systems is two identical channels connected in parallel 
known as 1oo2 where the protective function can be implemented if one of the two components 
is operational as a minimum. Therefore, only a dangerous failure in both channels results in 
failure of the safety function on demand. Despite enhancing the system availability, provision of 
redundancy may however present CCF which takes place when two or more components fail 
concurrently due to a common stressor. Liu et al. [19] developed a reliability model for 1oo2 
safety system on the foundation of simple structure discounting CCF. In this section, we intend 
to develop a new Markov model for a 1oo2 redundant safety related system by inclusion of CCF 
in conjunction with incorporating demand for the first time. The generic underlying assumptions 
itemised for simple system are all valid for 1oo2 SRS. The possible states of the system are 
outlined in Table 3 and the Markov transition diagram is illustrated in Figure 7: 
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Table 3 – States of a 1oo2 SRS 
State Property Demand State 
0 Hazardous On Demand 
1 2 DU No Demand 
2 1 Functional, 1 DU On Demand 
3 1 Functional, 1 DU No Demand 
4 2 Functional On Demand 
5 CCF No Demand 
6 Available No Demand 
7 Safe N/A 
 
Similar to the simple configuration, the 1oo2 safety related system consists of the combined 
effect of the SRS states and process demand levied on the safety system. The process demand 
and its reset rates as well as renewal rate for the 1oo1 system can be adopted for a 1oo2 SRS, on 
the basis that the redundant configuration can be employed as a replacement in kind to the simple 
architecture and in the same industrial application to enhance reliability. The system transitions 
due to dangerous undetected failure rate, 𝜆𝐷𝑈, and associated repair, 𝜇𝐷𝑈, are intact. However, 
similar to 1oo1 simple system, DD failures, 𝜆𝐷𝐷, and associated DD repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝐷, are 
excluded from the reliability model since the DD failure rates, 𝜆𝐷𝐷, for PRV are annulled. 
Change to the system dynamics due to safe failure rate, 𝜆𝑆, either detected or undetected and its 
subsequent repair rate, 𝜇𝑆, are entailed within the proposed model, consistent with the simple 
structure. The system transition rates in the 1oo2 redundant safety system is 𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐼  for independent 
failures and 𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐶  for undetected CCFs where 𝛽𝑈 represents the undetected CCF factor. 
 
Starting with system in “available” status and no process demand (i.e. state 6), the safety system 
fails safely and transits to state 7 with failure rate 2𝜆𝑆 and reinstated to state 6 with safe repair 
rate 𝜇𝑆. The system unavailability solely due to safe failures is not foreseen in this reliability 
model since failure of both components (sequential or concurrent) is not embedded within the 
Markov chain. Similar to the simple configuration, the safe state 7 is illustrated for modelling 
purpose and has no impact on system’s reliability performance. The safety system is responding 
to a process demand in state 4 with both components functional. Upon fulfilment of the process 
demand the system transits back to the original state 6. The transition rate from state 6 to 3 is the 
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minimum of two independent dangerous undetected failures, 2(1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈. This excludes the 
dangerous undetected CCFs since any of the components can fail independently. An identical 
transition occurs between state 4 and 2 whilst the system is responding to a demand. The system 
will transit to the “available” states 6 (from state 3) or “fully functional” state 4 (from state 2) 
when the failed component is repaired with 𝜇𝐷𝑈 repair rate during the next proof test interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Markov Transition Diagram for a 1oo2 SRS 
 
In state 2, the safety related system is responding to a process demand with only one component 
functioning whereas in state 3 no demand is levied on the system. The safety system alternates 
between states 2 and 3 depending on manifestation of a process demand or removal of the 
demand when it terminates. Single DU or spurious activation does not impair system ability to 
respond to a process demand and hence has no impact on its availability is envisaged. In this case 
safety system is still defined as in “functioning” state. The system conveys to state 1 from state 3 
upon occurrence of a DU failure, (1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈, resulting in failure of the remaining functioning 
component. This means that in state 1 the safety system endures two consecutive DU failures and 
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hence no longer functional. Subsequently, the system can be reinstated to the original “available” 
state post completion of two repairs in succession. 
 
The CCF can occur on four separate occasions, one of which is when an individual component is 
in failed state whilst the other component is still functional. Example of this scenario is excessive 
vibration of instrument tubing pipework leading to the failure of the remaining level temperature 
transmitter whilst the other field transmitter already failed due to a separate cause. In this regard 
a shift from state 3 to state 5 is practical with 𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈 common cause failure rate when there is no 
demand imposed on the system. On the other hand, a CCF transpires during an on demand 
transition from state 2 to state 0 when one of the components is in failed status and the remaining 
component is functional and responding to a process demand. Additionally, a CCF may take 
place when system is in “available” state and there is no demand resulting in system transition 
from state 6 to state 5 with 𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈 failure rate. The CCF can also arise when system is 
responding to a process demand in state 4 leading to a system transition to the hazardous state 0 
with the same failure rate. It is assumed that repair of CCFs are carried out in a single stage 
repair and as such sequential repair of individual components is not deemed necessary. As such, 
the system transits from state 5 to state 6 in a singular transition and no consecutive repair for 
CCF is considered in this model. 
 
The hazardous state (state 0) represents a situation when the safety system sustains a failure and 
there is a demand for activation of the safety function. The hazardous state 0 is reached when 
both components are failed either due to two sequential undetected failures (6-3-1), a 
combination of DU and CCF (6-3-5), or a standalone CCF (6-5); and a demand arises with 𝜆𝐷𝐸 
rate. Alternatively, emergence of a CCF in state 4 when system is responding to a process 
demand with two components fully functional (6-4) leads to a hazardous event. The system also 
visits hazardous state when it fails dangerously whilst responding to a process demand. In this 
circumstance, the system visits hazardous state from state 2 where the system is responding to a 
process demand with the only remaining functional component (6-4-2) and it fails dangerously, 
either due to single DU or CCF, resulting in impairment of the protection layer and exposure to a 
hazardous event. A restoration action is instigated when the system enters the hazardous state 0. 
Upon completion of the restoration with mean time 1 𝜇𝑇⁄ , the system is started up again in an “as 
good as new condition” in state 6. This is only achievable where the hazardous event is either 
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repeatable or renewable in accordance with the classification identified by Youshiamura [53]. No 
transition from state 0 to states 1, 2, 4 and 5 is considered in this model post occurrence of a 
hazardous event. 
 
It is crucial to highlight that the aforementioned scenarios involve common cause and dangerous 
undetected failures only and do not encompass DD failures. Moreover, it is assumed that only 
one component can be repaired at a time since only one maintenance team is available onsite. 
The primary property of any Markov process also known as Markov property is that the future 
status of the system depends on the current status of the system only and is independent of its 
past circumstances. This property is embedded within the Markov chain developed for the 1oo2 
SRS as a memoryless system. Furthermore, the system fulfils the secondary feature of Markov 
process recognised as stationary property in which the transition probabilities from one state to 
another state remain constant with time. As such, the steady state probabilities (𝜋𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0, … ,7) 
can be derived from the transition diagram. The steady state equations corresponding to the 
Markov transition diagram in Figure 7 for 1oo2 SRS are as follows: 
 
(𝜆𝐷𝐸 + 𝜇𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃3 = 2(1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃6 + 𝜇𝐷𝐸𝑃2 + 𝜇𝐷𝑈𝑃1 
(𝜇𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜇𝐷𝐸)𝑃2 = 2(1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃4 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃3 
(𝜇𝐷𝐸 + (2 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈)𝑃4 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃6 + 𝜇𝐷𝑈𝑃2 
𝜇𝑇𝑃0 = 𝜆𝐷𝐸(𝑃5 + 𝑃1) + 𝜆𝐷𝑈(𝛽𝑈𝑃4 + 𝑃2) 
(𝜇𝐶𝐶 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸)𝑃5 = 𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈(𝑃6 + 𝑃3) 
(𝜇𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸)𝑃1 = (1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃3 
𝜇𝑆𝑃7 = 2𝜆𝑆𝑃6 
(36) 
 
Similar to the 1oo1 simple system the summation of steady state probabilities is unity taking into 
account that the system alternates between all possible states, ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 0,… ,7. The effect 
of Proof Test Coverage (PTC) was overlooked in various publications including studies based on 
Markovian methodology [3, 19, 49] and those that employed non-Markovian techniques [23] on 
the basis of comprehensiveness (100% detection rate) of proof tests. This is also apparent in the 
IEC 61508 approach since the formulae do not entail the effects of non-comprehensive proof 
testing [36]. Likewise, the evaluation of proof test coverage was not explored further in this 
paper on the basis that proof tests are comprehensive. However, in accordance with the latest 
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edition of IEC 61511 (2016), if the proof tests are not 100% accurate, then the PTC ratio shall be 
considered. This enables the analysers/designers to account for the DU failures which can never 
be detected by proof tests, as well as to account for DU failures which can be found by complete 
execution of proof tests but which will be missed if proof tests are not completely executed. 
Incorporation of PTC within the reliability model may potentially lead to substantial alteration in 
the structure of the Markov chain and therefore subject to a thorough analysis of the model’s 
behaviour prior to incorporation of PTC as an additional variable. The proposed reliability model 
in this paper however provides a foundation to include the PTC in the next phase of its 
development. 
4.3 Markov Reliability Performance Indicators 
When a safety related system is utilised to reduce risk, IEC 61508 [4] stipulates requirements to 
demonstrate that the reliability performance of safety system is adequate to satisfy the specified 
risk acceptance criteria. The acceptance criteria are often stated in terms of a maximum tolerable 
HEF, from which a SIL requirement, and eventually, a PFD requirement may be deduced [1, 4]. 
It is noted that PFD should in principle, cover both the instantaneous activation of the SRS and 
the successful performance of the system during the demand period. In practice, most calculation 
approaches fail to account for the possibility of having a failure during the demand period. As 
such, the PFD is well suited as input parameter to many methods for risk analysis including but 
not limited to fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and LOPA [2]. In this regard, PFD and HEF 
are used in this paper to measure and compare the performance of the proposed reliability model 
of 1oo2 redundant configuration versus established simple structure. 
 
Table 4 – Markov Performance Indicators for 1oo1 & 1oo2 Safety Related Systems 
Model PFD HEF 
1oo1 SRS 𝑃3 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃3 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃2 
1oo2 SRS 𝑃1 + 𝑃5 𝜆𝐷𝐸(𝑃5 + 𝑃1) + 𝜆𝐷𝑈(𝛽𝑈𝑃4 + 𝑃2) 
 
The 1oo1 SRS system will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is in state 3 
whereas the 1oo2 SRS will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is in states 1 or 5. 
Furthermore, the frequency (per hour) of entering into the hazardous state is equivalent to the 
visit frequency to state 0, from any other state. The PFD and HEF for the 1oo1 safety system are 
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given in Table 4. For a low demand SRS, HEF is the product of the demand rate, 𝜆𝐷𝐸, for the 
SRS and the conditional probability that the SRS fails to function, PFD, given a demand, such 
that 𝐻𝐸𝐹 ≈ 𝑃𝐹𝐷. 𝜆𝐷𝐸. This is in line with the Markov models developed in this paper for 1oo1 
and 1oo2 configurations. 
4.4 Markov Model vs IEC 61508 Approach 
A comparison between the Markov models proposed in this paper and IEC 61508 approach for 
single structure and redundant configurations of safety related systems are provided in this 
section. In addition to the assumptions listed in section 3.6 the following principles are adopted 
in line with IEC 61508 general philosophies for determination of SRS reliability performance: 
 dangerous detected failure rate for the PRVs is annulled and hence discarded; 
 process demand is not incorporated within the IEC 61508 reliability calculation; 
 safe failures are excluded by IEC 61508 approach for evaluating reliability of SRSs. 
4.4.1 IEC 61508 Approach for 1oo1 SRS 
The reliability performance of 1oo1 SRS for pressure relief valve can be calculated directly in 
accordance with IEC 61508 [4]. Noting the underlying assumptions, the pictorial representation 
of IEC 61508 approach for a 1oo1 SRS is shown in Figure 8 with only DU failure dictating the 
system unavailability. It is to be noted that Figure 8 is the authors’ Markov model interpretation 
of the IEC 61508 approach for DU failures and repairs in a 1oo1 safety architecture, it does not 
appear in IEC 61508. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – IEC 61508 Approach for DU Failure & Repair Rates of 1oo1 SRS 
 
In this case the channel MDT is obtained directly from Equation (15). The average probability of 
failure on demand for a 1oo1 architecture provided by the IEC 61508 standard can also be 
simplified as function of component failure rate and mean down time as follows: 
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𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈(
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅) (37) 
Comparison between the 1oo1 Markov model (Figure 6) and IEC 61508 approach (Figure 8) 
illustrates the over simplistic approach taken by the latter in quantifying reliability performance 
of the safety related system. In this case due to elimination of safe failures and exclusion of 
demand parameter the Markov chain is rationalised to a single stage transition between the 
operational status of the SRS and unavailability of the systems due to DU failure mode. In this 
case if 𝜆𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 ≪ 0.1, one can justify that the conventional 
1
2⁄ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝜏 is a good approximation 
to the value of PFD for the 1oo1 safety related system. 
4.4.2 IEC 61508 Approach for 1oo2 SRS 
Similar to the simple system, the reliability performance of 1oo2 SRS can be calculated directly 
in accordance with the international standards. The IEC 61508 [4] approach for the 1oo2 SRS 
redundant configuration is demonstrated in Figure 9. It is observed that the number of transition 
nodes is half of the Markov model due to exclusion of process demand. Despite complexity of 
Markov models for reliability analysis of SRSs subject to process demand, the thoroughness, 
flexibility and accuracy of such a reliability model outstrips its disadvantages of use. This Figure 
9 is the authors’ Markov model interpretation of the IEC 61508 approach for DU failures and 
repairs in a 1oo2 safety architecture, it does not appear in IEC 61508. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – IEC 61508 Approach for CCF, DU Failure & Repair Rates of 1oo2 SRS 
 
 
The average probability of failure on demand can be calculated as probability of system being in 
states “Common Cause Failure” OR “Sequential Undetected Failures”. The average probability 
of failure on demand for the 1oo2 architecture provided by the IEC 61508 [4] standard can then 
be simplified as follows: 
𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 = 2 [𝜆𝐷𝑈(1 − 𝛽𝑈)[
𝜏
3⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅]]
2
+ 𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈(
𝜏
2⁄ + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅) 
(38) 
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Although the reliability calculation of 1oo2 SRS proposed by the standard appears to be simpler 
and requires minimum computational effort, the dynamic behaviour of the system due to 
imposition of process demand is ignored. 
4.4.3 IEC 61508 Reliability Performance Indicators 
The PFD and HEF performance indicators for the 1oo1 and 1oo2 SRS based on IEC 61508 
approach are listed in Table 5. The HEF is derived from 𝐻𝐸𝐹 ≈ 𝑃𝐹𝐷. 𝜆𝐷𝐸 using the conditional 
probability of SRS failure given imposition of a demand. 
Table 5 – IEC 61508 Performance Indicators of 1oo1 & 1oo2 Safety Related Systems 
Model PFD HEF 
1oo1 SRS 𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1 
1oo2 SRS 𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 
 
The simple SRS system will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is in DU state. 
The redundant SRS on the other hand will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is 
in states “Common Cause Failure” OR “Sequential Undetected Failures”. When using these 
indicators the operability of the SRS in low demand mode of operation shall be ensured to satisfy 
the eligibility criteria although the value of the process demand is an irrelevant factor here. 
5.0 Application: Study of a Tank Pressure Protection System 
To validate the proposed model, a flammable Liquid Storage Tank (LST) [54,55] has been 
undertaken in this paper as a case study. The Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) of the 
flammable liquid storage tank is illustrated in Figure 10. The equipment and field 
instrumentation notations used in the P&ID are provided in Table 6 in a tabular format. 
Table 6 – LST Equipment & Instrumentation Notation 
Equipment & Valves Field Instrumentation 
FCV Flow Control Valve FIC Flow Indicator Controller 
LST Liquid Storage Tank FT Flow Transmitter 
PCV Pressure Control Valve LAH High Level Alarm 
PRV Pressure Relief Valve PAH High Pressure Alarm 
PZ Centrifugal Pump PI Pressure Indicator 
V Isolation Valve PIC Pressure Indicator Controller 
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The LST is designed to store flammable liquid hydrocarbon supplied by trucks under slight 
positive nitrogen pressure. Nitrogen is used as a blanket gas to prevent ingress of oxygen and 
eliminate formation of a stoichiometric mixture within the ullage space of the tank. The 
controller PIC maintains the positive pressure within the tank via Pressure Control Valves (PCV1 
and PCV2). Tank liquid level and internal pressure is monitored via field instrumentation, LAH 
and PAH. The tank is fitted with a redundant pressure relief system (PRV1 and PRV2) to release 
the excess liquid in an emergency. A centrifugal pump (PZ) is installed downstream of the tank 
to supply the liquid to the process plant. The PI monitors the pump discharge pressure and the 
discharge flow is controlled via a Basic Process Control System (BPCS) consisting of a Flow 
Transmitter (FT), a Flow Controller (FIC) and a dedicated Flow Control Valve (FCV). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Flammable Liquid Storage Tank P&ID 
 
Various manual valves (V1 - V10) are installed to allow isolation and maintenance of equipment. 
The tank can also be drained for maintenance and inspection purposes. The system is operational 
in continuous mode to feed the downstream facilities. The LST and associated equipment are 
located on an onshore plant and segregated from the main process units by distance. 
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5.1 Layers of Protection 
Various layers of protections are embedded within the design of the LST to prevent the rise of 
the liquid level and mitigate its consequences. These protection layers consisting of 
instrumentation and mechanical devices as demonstrated in the P&ID are as follows: 
 Instrument IPLs: rise of the liquid level will result in initiation of the LAH which requires 
operator action to shut down the process system and cease the incoming flow. The liquid rise 
within the tank will also result in elevation of LST internal pressure. The PAH will then alert 
the operator of any deviation in operating limits to allow remedial action to be undertaken. 
There is no automated instrument shutdown (i.e. SIS) included within the design. 
 Mechanical IPLs: where the critical alarms (CAs) fail to initiate OR the operator fails to 
respond to the alarms, the tank pressure relief system will be activated. The PRVs will direct 
excess liquid to the flare system for disposal. The overpressure protection system designed 
for the tank consists of two redundant PRVs in parallel. Each PRV is fully sized and provide 
100% relief capacity for full release of liquid. As such, availability of only one PRV at any 
time would suffice. The set pressures of the PRVs are identical and calculated at above tank 
operating pressure but below its design envelope to maintain the integrity of the tank. The 
reliability performance of a redundant PRV system versus sole PRV configuration will be 
the focus of this case study to assess the application of the proposed model. 
 
It shall be noted that the use of parallel connection of identical channels is not always the correct 
way to implement a 1oo2 safety architecture. There is a distinction between so called “reliability 
architectures” in which success depends on the connectivity from input to output, and “safety 
architectures” where success relies on the ability to disrupt continuity. 
5.2 Process Demand 
Process demand on the PRVs will be initiated by uncontrolled rise of the liquid level resulting in 
pressure spike within the tank. The underlying causes of liquid rise within the LST are comprised 
of the following: 
 uncontrolled loading operation resulting in rise of the liquid level within the tank; AND 
 failure of the tank downstream equipment such as  
o pump failure; OR 
 Page 37 
R
eliab
ility
 A
n
aly
sis o
f S
afety
 In
stru
m
en
ted
 S
y
stem
s S
u
b
ject to
 P
ro
cess D
em
an
d
 
F
irst Y
ear R
ep
o
rt 
o closure of the isolation valves (V3 and/or V4); OR 
o malfunction of the flow control ancillary equipment (FT, FIC and/or FCV). 
The aforementioned underlying causes in conjunction with the failure of the IPLs results in 
generating demand on PRVs. Therefore, to quantify the frequency of process demand it is 
necessary to evaluate each of these causes and assess the likelihood of combined failures in the 
logical sequence as identified by the process hazard analysis. 
5.3 Hazardous Event & Consequence Assessment 
The uncontrolled rise of the flammable liquid level within the LST, will result in over 
pressurisation of the tank. This hazard will be prevented by the PRVs by releasing the excess 
flammable liquid into the flare system. It is assumed that the flare system is suitably designed to 
handle excess fluids and an automatic action will be initiated by a robust level control system in 
the flare knock out drum to restore the process to the original status within its operating limits. 
No damage to the equipment in this scenario is envisaged since the release to the flare system 
reduces the tank pressure. As such, the extent of the hazardous event in this case is limited to 
environmental damage only and is considered as a repeatable hazard [53]. 
 
Failure of the pressure relief system to open on demand as the last protection layer whilst the 
liquid level is continuously rising within the tank, will result in over pressurisation of the tank 
and ultimately impairment of the tank integrity and pipework / tank rupture leading to loss of 
containment. The tank is equipped with a dedicated bund which is suitably sized for a full-size 
rupture and hence, the flammable liquid will be removed when released to reduce personnel 
exposure to hazardous / toxic material. It is assumed that upon loss of containment, the plant Fire 
& Gas (F&G) system will initiate an executive action to shut down the loading operations and 
prevent further liquid inflow. In addition, the process shutdown and isolation of all potential 
energy sources will prevent ignition of flammable gas cloud and potential escalation of 
hazardous event i.e. fire / explosion. This is considered as a renewable hazard [53] and the 
system can be restored to the original status upon repair of the tank and associated pipework. 
 
Where the vapour cloud finds an ignition source in the absence of F&G initiation (e.g. failure or 
delay in detection of flammable atmosphere) it results in fire or explosion event. If immediately 
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ignited the fire scenarios envisaged are predominantly pool fire because of tank rupture and 
substantial sudden loss of containment. The pool fire will not be contained within the dedicated 
bund area as the integrity of the bund is diminished which may affect adjacent facilities. In the 
case of a delayed ignition, the consequence of release may be a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
for onshore assets with potential for generating high overpressure magnitude depending on the 
level of confinement and congestion of the area. Due to the severity of the consequence 
associated with fire or explosion, they are considered as non-renewable fatal hazardous events 
and hence are excluded from the proposed Markov model in this paper. Other initiating causes 
that could lead to over pressurisation of the tank such as exposure of the LST to external fire 
leading to Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) are excluded from this 
analysis. A list of foreseeable Hazardous Events (HEs) and associated consequences upon 
imposition of process demand on PRVs taking into account the available mitigating IPLs is listed 
in Table 7. The HE1 represents the outcome of PRVs being operational whereas HE2 – HE4 
correspond to consequences of PRV failure on demand studied in this paper. The hazardous 
event HE5 is excluded from the scope of this study due to the severity of the consequence as the 
system restoration to the original operating state is not deemed as feasible in a timely manner. 
 
Table 7 – Hazardous Events & Consequence Descriptions 
Event Description Hazardous Event 
HE1 Disposal of excess fluid via flare, no Loss of Containment (LoC) repeatable 
HE2 LoC, contained within the bund and drained renewable 
HE3 LoC outwith the bund, detected by gas detection system renewable 
HE4 LoC outwith the bund, undetected gas release, unignited cloud renewable 
HE5 Ignited HC release, fire / explosion with substantial asset damage non-renewable fatal 
5.4 Analysis of Pressure Protection System 
The bowtie diagram in Figure 11 presents the Basic Events (BEs) and protection layers in which 
their failures generate demand on LST pressure relief valves. 
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Figure 11 – Process Hazard Analysis Using Bowtie Methodology 
 
The reliability data for instrumentation in Table 8 is extracted from the PDS Data Handbook [52] 
for individual components. The reliability figures for equipment are obtained in accordance with 
the Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) project [56]. In line with the IEC 61508 [4] 
recommended value, the MTTR value for all equipment / instrumentation is set at 8 hours. The 
proof test interval is determined based on maintenance and operability requirements of the 
equipment accordingly. The FIC subsystem is considered as an industrial Programmable Logic 
Controller (PLC) comprised of an analogue input, a single processing unit (CPU) and a digital 
output configuration. The failure rate of the Flow Control Valve (FCV) is specified for 
frequently operated service. The failure rates associated with FCV actuators, pilot / solenoid 
valve etc. are excluded from this analysis. 
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Table 8 – Initiating Causes & Failure Frequencies 
Event Initiating Cause 𝝀𝑫𝑼(× 𝟏𝟎
−𝟔 𝒉⁄ ) 𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑹(𝒉) 𝝉(𝒉) 
BE1 Isolation Valve (V3) Fails Closed 2.1 8 17,520 
BE2 Pump (PZ) Failure to Start 2.5 8 8,760 
BE3 Isolation Valve (V4) Fails Closed 2.1 8 17,520 
BE4 Flow Transmitter (FT) Failure 0.6 8 26,280 
BE5 Flow Controller (FIC) Failure 4.9 8 4,380 
BE6 Control Valve (FCV) Fails Closed 2.2 8 17,520 
 
The proactive barriers in this case study are combination of critical alarms (level and pressure) 
and operator action to cease loading operation. The DU failure rate value for the PAH / LAH 
alarms assumes operating in a clean medium with no potential for clogging of sensing lines [52]. 
The likelihood of human error is computed in this paper using the Human Error Assessment & 
Reduction Technique (HEART) technique [57] introduced in 1985. The generic task for this case 
study considered as “restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, with 
some checking” with nominal human unreliability of 0.003 and an error producing condition of 
“a mismatch between perceived and real risk” corresponding to a factor of 4 [57]. The likelihood 
of operator failing to respond to the alarm is therefore calculated as 1.2 × 10−2 for the Human 
Actions (HA) associated with the critical alarms, HA1 and HA2. 
Table 9 – Proactive Barrier Failure Frequencies 
Event Initiating Cause 𝝀𝑫𝑼(× 𝟏𝟎
−𝟔 𝒉⁄ ) 𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑹(𝒉) 𝝉(𝒉) 
CA1 Level Alarm (LAH) Failure 0.6 8 26,280 
CA2 Pressure Alarm (PAH) Failure 2.0 8 13,140 
 
Using Bowtie methodology in Figure 11, the likelihood of LST discharge line breakdown 
together with failure of proactive IPLs (pressure and level alarms) leading to uncontrolled rise of 
the liquid level within LST is estimated as 4.28 × 10−5. The tank is loaded every 6 hours via 
trucks, hence the loading frequency can be computed as 0.17 per hour assuming continuous 
operation within a year (i.e. 8,760h). Therefore, the frequency of process demand imposition on 
PRVs considering the loading frequency and probability of failure for LST discharge line is 
obtained as 𝜆𝐷𝐸 = 7.13 × 10
−6. The process demand duration is assumed to be 𝜇𝐷𝐸 = 1 × 10
−4 
per hour. The restoration rate from hazardous event is also projected as 𝜇𝑇 = 1 × 10
−3 per hour 
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[19] corresponding to 1000h mean restoration time after a hazardous event takes place. This 
estimate is deemed as suitable since we are addressing repeatable and/or renewable hazardous 
event only, although the severity of the consequence dominates this value. 
5.5 Reliability Performance of Protection System 
5.5.1 Analysis of Overall Model 
The PDS Handbook [52] provides the following additional estimates for the PRV failures rates: 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 0, 𝜆𝐷 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = 2.2 × 10
−6 per hour and 𝜆𝑆 = 1.1 × 10
−6  per hour. Moreover, we set the 
mean repair time of a safe failure as 10h corresponding to 𝜇𝑆 = 1 × 10
−1 per hour. The CCF 
factor (𝛽𝑈) varies between 0.01 and 0.2 as per IEC 61508 recommended range hence an average 
value of 𝛽𝑈 = 0.1 is applied. The interval between proof tests is also considered to be two years 
or 𝜏 = 17,520h. These estimates are uncertain and will be strongly dependent on the 
maintenance regime of the LST facilities. The SRS reliability data are summarised in Table 10. 
Table 10 – SRS Reliability Data 
SRS 
(× 𝟏𝟎−𝟔 𝒉⁄ ) (× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒 𝒉⁄ ) (𝒉) 
𝝀𝑺 𝝀𝑫𝑫 𝝀𝑫𝑼 𝝁𝑺 𝝁𝑫𝑫 𝝁𝑫𝑼
𝟏𝒐𝒐𝟏 𝝁𝑫𝑼
𝟏𝒐𝒐𝟐 𝝁𝑪𝑪 𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑹 𝝉 
PRV 1.1 0 2.2 1000 0 1.14 1.71 1.14 8 17,520 
 
The DU repair rate for single and redundant SRS systems are calculated as per Equations (16) 
and (22) respectively. The state equations were solved using MATLAB for both 1oo1 and 1oo2 
systems presented in this paper and the calculated PFD and HEF values are outlined in Table 11: 
Table 11 – Reliability Analysis Results for 1oo1 & 1oo2 SRSs 
Performance Indicator PFD HEF 
1oo1 SRS 1.67 × 10−2 (SIL 1) 2.60 × 10−7 
1oo2 SRS 1.93 × 10−3 (SIL 2) 3.13 × 10−8 
 
As shown a 1oo1 SRS achieves SIL 1 target only whereas introduction of a redundant element 
improves reliability of the system by an order of magnitude meeting SIL 2 requirements. The 
system response to the variation in CCF factor (0.01 – 0.2) is also analysed in Figure 12 where 
1oo1 simple system remains stagnant whereas the PFD for 1oo2 configuration increases as the 
𝛽𝑈 value rises but remains substantially lower than a 1oo1 system. The behaviour of the 1oo2 
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model is further studied in Figure 13 which illustrates that the redundant configuration can 
achieve both SIL 2 and SIL 3 depending on the value of CCF factor. This highlights the 
prominence of 𝛽𝑈 and appropriate design method to reduce its impact on functionality of SRSs. 
  
Figure 12 – PFD comparison of 1oo1 SRS vs 1oo2 SRS 
with varying 𝛽𝑈 value 
Figure 13 – PFD trend for 1oo2 SRS with varying 𝛽𝑈 
value 
  
Figure 14 – HEF comparison of 1oo1 SRS vs 1oo2 SRS with varying 𝛽𝑈 value 
The safety performance of the system for 1oo2 SRS is also enhanced due to reduction in 
hazardous event frequency in comparison with a simple configuration. The graphical 
representation of this improvement is shown in Figure 14. The reduction in HEF is more 
apparent for lower values of CCF factor but declines as the 𝛽𝑈 acquires higher values although it 
remain lower than the simple system in its entirety. The model behaviour with respect to 
variation in CCF factor is coherent with the general features of redundant configurations. 
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5.5.2 Comparison of Markov Model vs IEC 61508 Approach 
A comparison of performance indicators for the proposed Markov model versus IEC 61508 
approach to compute the PFD of 1oo2 SRS is carried out. Despite the PFD trends against 
variation in CCF factor is identical for both methods across two SIL ranges (SIL 2 and 3) in 
Figure 15, the IEC 61508 approach gives more conservative results due to higher PFD. The 
variation between the results is minimal however a reliability improvement between 9% - 15% 
can be observed from the corresponding curves acquired with the Markov technique. This is a 
reaffirmation on accuracy and consistency of the Markov model in the reliability analysis of 
SRSs which is in line with IEC 61508 [4] average PFD calculation requirements. Although the 
IEC 61508 approach overlooks the impact of process demand in its computation of average PFD, 
Markov model considers all influencing elements including demand rate and its duration in 
addition to established system failure modes and repair rates. 
  
Figure 15 – PFD comparison of Markov Model vs IEC 
61508 Approach for 1oo2 SRS with varying 𝛽𝑈 value 
Figure 16 – HEF comparison of Markov Model vs IEC 
61508 Approach for 1oo2 SRS with varying 𝛽𝑈 value 
The two methods for calculating the system performance are also compared with regards to HEF 
and the result is shown in Figure 16. The HEF for both techniques increases as the CCF factor 
rises, however the IEC 61508 method shows lower frequency of visit to hazardous event when 
comparing with Markov Model. This reduction can be explained by the supplementary part of 
HEF equation for 1oo2 Markov model: 
 
Table 12 – HEF Comparison of Markov Model vs IEC 61508 Approach for 1oo2 SRSs 
Technique Markov Model IEC 61508 Approach 
1oo2 SRS 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈(𝛽𝑈𝑃4 + 𝑃2) 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 
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This is due to flexibility of Markov model to evaluate dynamic behaviour of the system taking 
into cognisance all possible means of system entering hazardous event whereas, the IEC 61508 
have no visibility on vulnerability of SRS at the time of response to demand imposition. 
5.5.3 Impact of Proof Test Interval on Reliability Performance 
The behaviour of the proposed 1oo2 SRS model against various proof test intervals, 𝜏, in 
conjunction with variation in CCF factor, 𝛽𝑈, is evaluated in this section and the model 
performance is shown in Figure 17 – Figure 19. The proof test intervals used for illustration 
purpose vary between 3 years to 1 month periods and the CCF factor alternates between 0.01 and 
0.2. It is observed that the reliability performance of the 1oo2 system improves gradually by 
simultaneous reduction of proof test intervals and CCF factor in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 – PFD variations against 𝜏 and 𝛽𝑈 values for 
1oo2 SRS 
Figure 18 – PFD variations against 𝜏 and 𝛽𝑈 values for 
1oo2 SRS: comparison with SIL boundaries 
  
Figure 19 – HEF variations against  𝜏 and 𝛽𝑈 values for 1oo2 SRS 
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A selective value set of the abovementioned range as per Table 13 was analysed further together 
with the boundaries of SIL 2/3 and SIL 3/4 in Figure 18. As shown, a suitable level of safety 
integrity can be accomplished by optimising the proof test interval and CCF factor. Whilst the 
combined effect of high proof test interval and upper range CCF factor pushes PFD value 
towards mid SIL 2, the combined lower values of 𝜏 and 𝛽𝑈 can be utilised to attain SIL 4 
accordingly. The flexibility of fluctuating between SIL 2 - 4 using alternative values, affords an 
opportunity for the design engineer to adjust the SRS in accordance with the design requirements 
as deemed appropriate. 
 
Table 13 – Selected Range for Proof Test and CCF Factor 
Parameters 5 4 3 2 1 
𝜏 26,280h 17,520h 13,140h 8,760h 4,380h 
𝛽𝑈 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 
 
The system visit frequency to hazardous event for the selected range of proof test and CCF factor 
(Table 13) is illustrated in Figure 19. A decrease in HEF is seen as the proof test interval reduces 
from 3 years to 1 month although due to logarithmic scale the disparity is deemed as a minimal 
decline. A reduction in HEF pattern is also perceived as the CCF factor gains lower values. The 
reduction in HEF is more notable for lower values of proof test and negligible variations are 
identified as the proof test interval rises. As such, the proof test interval has a more dominant 
impact on HEF in comparison with the CCF factor. The results can also be used for prioritisation 
of influencing factors at design stage of the SRS. The above illustration indicates that the 
proposed 1oo2 safety related system model is in line with the anticipated trend against variations 
in proof test intervals and CCF factor. 
 
The outcome of this appraisal concludes that reduction in proof test intervals will generally result 
in reduction of failure on demand probability and system visit to hazardous event 
simultaneously. However, the implementation of minimum proof test interval may not be 
practical as other influencing elements play a substantial role in determination of the optimum 
test interval. The expenditure associated with conducting the proof tests on a more frequent basis 
including labour / equipment on one hand and disruption in process continuity (e.g. risk 
associated with shutdown and start-up even though for a limited period) on the other hand will be 
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dominating factors and may overcome the benefits gained because of reduced proof test interval. 
As such, a balance between expenditure and maintaining safety integrity of the system is 
required to be established. A cost benefit analysis to facilitate application of risk reduction to As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) level would be beneficial in these circumstances. 
5.6 Sensitivity Examination of 1oo2 SRS 
We now investigate the effect of varying model parameters including the demand rate, demand 
duration, component failure and associated repair rates on the reliability and safety performance 
of 1oo2 SRS. The effect of varying parameters on the PFD and HEF are evaluated for 𝛽𝑈 in the 
range of 0.01 - 0.2 as recommended by IEC 61508. 
5.6.1 The Effect of 𝝀𝑫𝑬 and 𝝁𝑫𝑬 
We first study the effect of varying the demand rate, 𝜆𝐷𝐸. The effect of varying 𝜆𝐷𝐸 on the PFD 
and HEF are evaluated for demand rates equal to 10-8, 10-7, 10-6, 10-5 and 10-4 respectively. In 
order to illustrate the visit frequency to hazardous event we use -log10 scale on the y-axis. The 
PFD and HEF are functions of 𝜆𝐷𝐸 for the specified range of 𝛽𝑈 value as illustrated in Figure 20 
and Figure 21 respectively.  
  
Figure 20 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜆𝐷𝐸 Figure 21 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜆𝐷𝐸 
 
Increase in process demand means shifting from low demand mode to high demand mode of 
operation where SRS is required to respond more frequently to the demands inflicted by the 
process system. The PFD decreases as the demand rate rises according to the result shown in 
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Figure 20. This behaviour can be justified considering that the system will respond to the process 
demand more frequently whilst the demand frequency is on the rise. Therefore, the SRS function 
is discharged regularly resulting in reduction of test intervals and the system probability of 
failure on demand due to undetected dangerous failure will naturally reduce, as reflected by 
reduction in PFD value. Besides, the PFD ascends whilst the CCF rises for various 𝜆𝐷𝐸 based on 
Figure 20. The rise in PFD is steeper for lower demand rates however for more frequent process 
demands, the PFD increases gradually and hence loses sensitivity to the rise in 𝛽𝑈. The 
hazardous event frequency ascends whilst 𝜆𝐷𝐸 obtains higher values for a 1oo2 SRS as per 
Figure 21. This is due to prevailing impact of 𝜆𝐷𝐸 in HEF determination (𝜆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 + …), 
which dictates an increase in HEF despite reduction of PFD. This behaviour was anticipated 
considering the system is responding more often to process demand and component failures 
during this period will impair system capabilities in implementing protecting function. The 
curves for the different demand rates have a similar pattern and increase as the CCF rate 
elevates. 
  
Figure 22 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝐷𝐸 Figure 23 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝐷𝐸 
 
The effect of varying 𝜇𝐷𝐸 on the PFD and HEF is also assessed for 𝛽𝑈 in the similar range of 
0.01 - 0.2. Calculations are performed for five different values of demand reset rates including 
10-6, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2 and the results of these variations on the PFD and HEF are 
illustrated in Figure 22 and Figure 23 respectively. The PFD increases whilst the demand reset 
rate rises (i.e. demand duration reduces) as seen in Figure 22. This might be predicted by the 
following argument according to system transition diagram in Figure 7: as the demand duration 
reduces, the system spends lower portion of time in responding to the process demand in states 4 
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and 2. As such the likelihood of system transit to the remaining system states including states 1 
and 5 increases. This leads to higher system unavailability considering that the PFD for 1oo2 
SRS is defined as per Table 4. No disparity in the PFD trend for demand reset rates of 10-3 and 
10-2 is perceived although an increase in PFD value is observed whilst the CCF rate is on the 
rise. It is noted that the 1oo2 SRS can achieve SIL 3 / SIL 4 when demand reset rate is set at 10-6. 
As the demand duration reduces, the HEF descends in Figure 23 indicating improvement in 
safety performance for the 1oo2 safety related system. The frequency of system entering 
hazardous event shows an increase in HEF as the CCF failure rates obtain higher values across 
all selected values of 𝜇𝐷𝐸. The outcome of this sensitivity investigation is consistent with the 
observations of Liu et al. [19] for the effect of 𝜆𝐷𝐸 and 𝜇𝐷𝐸 on a 1oo2 SRS (PRV system) in 
which the reliability performance indicators PFD and HEF exhibit a similar trend. 
5.6.2 The Effect of 𝝀𝑫𝑼, 𝝁𝑫𝑼 and 𝝁𝑪𝑪 
In order to study the effect of DU failure rate, 𝜆𝐷𝑈, on PFD and HEF, the assessment was 
conducted for various DU failure rates equal to 10-8, 10-7, 10-6, 10-5 and 10-4. Increase in 
component failure rate results in unavailability of SRS to respond to process demand and 
ultimately a surge in system average PFD as reflected in Figure 24. The PFD for the selected 
range of 𝜆𝐷𝑈 ascend sharply as the DU failure rate gains higher values, where 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = 10
−4 can 
no longer achieve SIL target as defined in IEC 61508.  
  
Figure 24 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜆𝐷𝑈 Figure 25 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜆𝐷𝑈 
 
This behaviour is also reiterated in the system visit to hazardous event scenario. As observed in 
Figure 25 the exposure to hazardous event increases since the system components fail more 
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frequently, reducing system availability to respond to process demand. The hazardous event 
frequency generally increases as the CCF rate rises for various 𝜆𝐷𝑈 values however, the impact 
of 𝛽𝑈 on HEF is less apparent for higher DU failure frequencies as 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = 10
−4 remains constant 
across the designated values for 𝛽𝑈. This may be due to the dominant impact of component 
failure rates that neutralise any change in 𝛽𝑈 values. 
 
The effect of DU failure rate on the reliability performance of 1oo2 SRS redundant system is in 
line with 1oo1 simple system. The PFD and the visit frequency of 1oo1 SRS for a low demand 
system are obtained by 𝑃𝐹𝐷 ≈ 1 2⁄ (𝜏. 𝜆𝐷𝑈) and 𝐻𝐸𝐹 ≈ 𝑃𝐹𝐷. 𝜆𝐷𝐸 respectively where the mean 
duration of the demands is smaller than the test interval [4, 19]. This means any alteration in DU 
failure rate will directly result in increase or decrease in unavailability of SRS and subsequently 
variation in visit frequency to the hazardous event. This pattern is consistent with the observation 
made in Figure 24 and Figure 25 as interpreted above which display a similar pattern of 
behaviour in 1oo1 and 1oo2 systems. 
  
Figure 26 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝐷𝑈 Figure 27 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝐷𝑈 
 
To explore the impact of DU repair rate, 𝜇𝐷𝑈, on SRS performance indicators, the sensitivity 
examination was carried out for a diverse range of 𝜇𝐷𝑈 consisting of 10
-6, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2 
consecutively. Higher repair rate leads to increased system reliability and hence is deemed as an 
improvement in system performance as illustrated in Figure 26 which proves this effect. It is 
observed that the PFD decreases as DU repair rate increases with 𝜇𝐷𝑈 = 10
−6 unable to achieve 
SIL target whereas the DU repair rates of 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2 meet SIL 2 / SIL 3 criteria. The HEF 
curves demonstrated in Figure 27 against 𝛽𝑈 for varying DD repair rates show a similar pattern 
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which is an emphasis on this model behaviour. Due to the enhanced repair rate, the system is less 
exposed to hazardous event thus a reduction in HEF can be realised in this analysis. Although the 
HEF increase against variation in 𝛽𝑈 is more evident for higher values of 𝜇𝐷𝑈, there is no notable 
change in system visiting the hazardous event when DU repair rate is fluctuating between 10-6 
and 10-5. The weakest performance of SRS can be identified from Figure 24 – Figure 27 as the 
combination of high DU failure rate and low DU repair rate which results in a considerable 
increase in probability of failure on demand for the high pressure protection system and 
consequently leads to frequent visits to hazardous state. When designing a SRS this combination 
shall be avoided, otherwise the effectiveness of SRS as an independent layer of protection will be 
compromised. Conversely the best SRS performance is observed with lowest DU failure rate and 
highest DU repair rate. 
  
Figure 28 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝐶𝐶 Figure 29 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝐶𝐶 
 
For completion of the sensitivity analysis, the effect of varying common cause repair rate, 𝜇𝐶𝐶, 
on the PFD and HEF is also reviewed as part of this study. The sensitivity examination is 
repeated for 𝜇𝐶𝐶 equivalent to 10
-6, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2. Consistent with the general 
philosophy of reliability performance of safety related system, an improvement in PFD is 
witnessed as the repair rate of common cause failure acquires higher values. It is noted that the 
PFD reduces as the common cause repair rate rises with system achieving higher integrity level 
of SIL 3 for 𝜇𝐶𝐶 obtaining 10
-3 and 10-2. The rise in 𝛽𝑈 value leads to the deterioration in 
probability of failure on demand as shown in Figure 28. 
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This model behaviour is also reflected in the HEF as the frequency of visit to the hazardous 
event reduces for higher common cause repair frequency. The reduction in HEF is more evident 
for lower values of common cause repair rates between 10-6 – 10-4 but limited disparity is 
witnessed when 𝜇𝐶𝐶 is fluctuating between 10
-3 and 10-2. The impact of increase in 𝛽𝑈 is 
noticeable, resulting in deterioration of the HEF across all values of common cause repair rate. 
The system behaviour against change in 𝜇𝐷𝑈 and 𝜇𝐶𝐶 leads to the same pattern of model 
behaviour considering that the 𝜇𝐶𝐶 will impact only one transition (from state 5 to state 6), 
whereas variation in 𝜇𝐷𝑈 will influence several transitions including 2 to 4, 1 to 3 and 3 to 6, and 
thereby its effect on system performance is more notable. 
5.6.3 The Effect of 𝝀𝑺 and 𝝁𝑺 
As discussed the safe failure of the SRS components should not have any impact on the 
reliability performance of the system. In order to examine this hypothesis a computation was 
performed for various safe failure rates comprising 10-8, 10-7, 10-6, 10-5 and 10-4. According to 
Figure 30 and Figure 31 the model displays no sensitivity to variation in 𝜆𝑆 and as such it is 
determined that the reliability performance of the system is independent of the safe failure rates. 
Fluctuation in the repair rate of safe failures should similarly have no effect of the performance 
indicators of the 1oo2 SRS. As such the calculation was rerun for safe repair rates of 10-4, 10-3, 
10-2, 10-1 and 1 respectively and the effect of change in 𝜇𝑆 on PFD and HEF is shown in Figure 
32 and Figure 33 consecutively. The result is an emphasis that any variation in repair rate of safe 
failures has no influence on the reliability performance of the model. This demonstrates the 
consistency of the model with the expected behaviour of 1oo2 redundant safety related system. 
  
Figure 30 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜆𝑆 Figure 31 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜆𝑆 
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Figure 32 – PFD verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝑆 Figure 33 – HEF verses 𝛽𝑈 with varying 𝜇𝑆 
5.6.4 Summary Results 
The summary of the sensitivity examination is outlined in Table 14 (excluding safe failure and 
associated repair) with the specified range of each parameter, PFD upper and lower values and 
the equivalent safety integrity level the system can achieve. 
Table 14 – Sensitivity Examination Summary of PFD & SIL Results for 1oo2 SRS 
Parameter Range 𝛽𝑈 Lower PFD High IL Upper PFD Low IL 
𝜆𝐷𝐸 10
-8 – 10-4 0.01 – 0.2 5.09E-04 SIL 3 1.09E-03 SIL 2 
𝜇𝐷𝐸 10
-6 0.01 – 0.2 6.35E-05 SIL 4 6.56E-04 SIL 3 
 10-5 – 10-2 0.01 – 0.2 2.84E-04 SIL 3 3.81E-03 SIL 2 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 10
-8 0.01 – 0.2 7.77E-07 > SIL 4 1.54E-05 SIL 4 
 10-7 0.01 – 0.2 8.31E-06 > SIL 4 1.54E-04 SIL 3 
 10-6 0.01 – 0.2 1.36E-04 SIL 3 1.58E-03 SIL 2 
 10-5 0.01 – 0.2 6.10E-03 SIL 2 1.86E-02 SIL 1 
 10-4 0.01 – 0.2 2.22E-01 < SIL1 2.58E-01 < SIL1 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 10
-6 0.01 – 0.2 1.30E-01 < SIL1 1.01E-01 < SIL1 
 10-5 0.01 – 0.2 3.27E-02 SIL 1 2.56E-02 SIL 1 
 10-4 – 10-2 0.01 – 0.2 9.59E-04 SIL 3 3.38E-03 SIL 2 
𝜇𝐶𝐶 10
-6 0.01 – 0.2 2.80E-03 SIL 2 4.83E-02 SIL 1 
 10-5 0.01 – 0.2 1.48E-03 SIL 2 2.36E-02 SIL 1 
 10-4 0.01 – 0.2 4.75E-04 SIL 3 4.00E-03 SIL 2 
 10-3 – 10-2 0.01 – 0.2 3.04E-04 SIL 3 2.26E-04 SIL 3 
SIL 3 
SIL 2 
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No credit has been taken in this case study for safety integrity level below 1 corresponding to 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 𝜖 [10−1, 0). Moreover, the PFD below 10-5 is considered as exceeding the highest safety 
integrity level. The results of the sensitivity analysis allow design engineers to identify the 
contributing parameters to the reliability and safety performance of the system and quantify their 
impacts. The next step would then be enhancing the system performance utilising positive effects 
and mitigating the negative impacts of those parameters that compromise the performance of 
SRSs. 
5.7 SIL Compliance 
There are three separate constraints that must be satisfied in SIL verification to qualify for SIL 2 
as per IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. These constraints comprised of PFD Calculation, Hardware 
Fault Tolerance (HFT) and Systematic Capability (SC). An SRS configuration proposed for SIL 
2 application must be based on PFD value, by route 1H or 2H for the architecture constraint, and 
by systematic capability. If any of these constraints result in a SIL 1 or lower rating, the 1oo2 
SRS is not approved for SIL 2 use. The proposed 1oo2 SRS configuration in the paper satisfies 
the first two constraints and meets at SIL 2 for the 1oo2 configuration. The third requirements in 
SIL verification process is systematic capability. The proposed configuration can achieve the 
systematic capability if the SRSs are either SIL 2 certified or the systematic capability can be 
achieved by “proven in use element” in accordance with IEC 61508. An alternative approach in 
enhancing the systematic capability is diverse redundancy where the redundant equipment is 
acquired based on dissimilar design and manufacturing process. 
 
Historically, valve actuators are identified as the weakest point of valve structures due to the 
complexity of the actuator assembly and required forces to generate adequate momentum in fluid 
to facilitate closure of the valve. Detailed review of failure records for valves reveals that a large 
proportion of the failure mechanisms are associated with the valve actuators. In contrast, the 
PRVs have much simpler structure, do not require signal processing for activation, do not have 
hydraulic/pneumatic/electric operated actuators and are not required to overcome substantial 
forces generated by fluids in motion (e.g. emergency shutdown valves) for activation and 
completion of the safety function. As such large proportion of failure potential associated with 
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actuators will be eliminated for PRVs. Consequently, the potential for systematic failure is 
substantially reduced. 
 
The systematic capability is predominantly concerned with considering all potential and 
unforeseeable scenarios at the design phase that may lead to the failure of SRS (e.g. incorrect 
selection of material for a temperature element to activate against specific temperature range 
which is not suitable for the application of interest). In this regard, the systematic capability for 
simple structure equipment such as PRV is minimal noting the advancement in design and 
manufacturing processes. Furthermore, the quality management systems associated with 
fabrication of PRVs are well established within the process industry hence minimising the 
associated systematic failures. Additionally, the PRVs are usually designed to fail open. 
Although this results in loss of revenue, commercial losses are the preferred option against other 
possible consequences (personnel or environmental impact). This is also a contributing factor in 
reduction of systematic failures since the equipment is designed to fail safe. As such, in the 
opinion of the authors’, the proposed PRV arrangement in Figure 10 is in full compliance with 
the three distinct requirements of IEC 61508 comprising of PFD Calculation, HFT and 
systematic capability even though the individual PRV devices have a systematic capability of 
SIL 1. 
6.0 Concluding Remarks 
In this article, a new reliability model for a redundant safety related system is proposed. The new 
model for a 1oo2 redundant configuration was developed based on an established 1oo1 simple 
architecture in low demand mode of operation. The new reliability model uses Markov chains to 
quantify the uncertainty associated with the probability of failure on demand and frequency of 
system visit to hazardous event to determine its reliability and safety performance respectively. 
The process demand imposition on SRS, together with the established system failure modes and 
associated repairs such as DU failures is considered. Additionally, this model incorporates CCF 
within the reliability analysis of 1oo2 redundant configuration for the first time. The model 
presented in this paper is an improvement to the Markov chain previously introduced by Liu et 
al. [19] by incorporation of CCF rate and associated repair frequency. The new reliability model 
is proposed for those SRSs where DD failure rate is annulled. The proposed Markov model was 
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compared with the IEC 61508 approach for 1oo2 redundant safety related system in the same 
application and its advantages in modelling dynamic behaviour of the systems subject to process 
demand were observed. 
 
The proposed model in this paper is validated using a case study of pressure protection system 
for a storage tank facilities handling flammable liquid hydrocarbon. A comparison of 1oo1 
simple system versus 1oo2 SRS highlights that the system performance improved predominantly 
due to the incorporation of a redundant configuration. This verifies that introduction of a 
redundant element enhances the reliability performance of the system by achieving a higher 
integrity level as well as improving the safety performance of the system by reducing the 
frequency of system visiting the hazardous state. The dynamic behaviour of the 1oo2 SRS was 
further analysed by performing a sensitivity examination of key model parameters including 
demand rate, demand duration, common cause failure / repair rate and component dangerous 
undetected failure rates and its associated repair rate. Generally, a deterioration of system 
performance indicators were witnessed due to the increase in CCF factor as anticipated. The 
results confirm that the model behaviour against variation in parameters is consistent with the 
overall expectation of SRS performance for a redundant 1oo2 configuration. 
 
It shall be noted that the assumption with regards to system restoration from the hazardous state 
to the “as good as new” condition, was made to enable calculation of the steady state 
probabilities and elimination of absorbing state. In some cases, however, this may not be 
applicable, or may deem as an unrealistic assumption. From a computational effort prospect, the 
detailed analysis of a multi-component system (e.g. 2oo3 etc.) will be more complex and the 
primary aspects of the analysis may easily dissolve in the computational details, however this has 
not been pursued any further in this paper and may be a topic for further work. At the same time, 
it would be of great interest to study the effects of DD failure and associated repair rate 
parameters in a 1oo2 SRS which is subject to process demand as well as inaccuracy of the proof 
test. These are also new topics for further research. It would also be intriguing to study the effect 
of homogeneous versus heterogeneous processes and to develop explicit links between constant 
failure rates and constant transition probabilities (continuous time vs discrete time), in order to 
explore their impact on the reliability analysis of SRSs. Another area of interest is to compare the 
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PFD calculation techniques where possible fluctuations (e.g. in process demand) can be captured 
by Markov modelling but neglected in the international standards formulae. 
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Notations 
𝑃𝑖 steady state probability for state 𝑖 
𝜏 proof test interval 
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) system transition probability from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 
𝑞𝑖𝑗 transition rate from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 
𝛽 total common cause failure factor 
𝛽𝐷 detected common cause failure factor 
𝛽𝑈 undetected common cause failure factor 
λ component failure rate 
λ𝐷𝐸 process demand rate 
𝜆𝐷 dangerous failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝐷 dangerous detected failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 dangerous undetected failure rate 
𝜆𝑆 safe failure rate 
𝜆𝑆𝐷 safe detected failure rate 
𝜆𝑆𝑈 safe undetected failure rate 
𝜆𝐶 common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝐼 independent failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐼  dangerous detected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶  dangerous detected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐼  dangerous undetected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐶  dangerous undetected common cause failure rate 
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𝜆𝑆𝐷
𝐼  safe detected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝑆𝐷
𝐶  safe detected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝑆𝑈
𝐼  safe undetected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝑆𝑈
𝐶  safe undetected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝑇 total failure rate 
𝜇 component repair rate 
𝜇𝐷𝐷 dangerous detected repair rate 
𝜇𝐷𝐸 demand reset rate 
𝜇𝐷𝑈 dangerous undetected repair rate 
𝜇𝑆 safe repair rate 
𝜇𝑇 renewal rate 
𝜋𝑖 steady state probability of system in state 𝑖 
𝐷𝐶 diagnostic coverage rate 
𝑃(𝑡) transition matrix at time 𝑡 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) probability of system in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝑃 transition probabilities matrix 
𝑟 states of stochastic process 
𝑓(𝑡) Probability density function of random variable 𝑡 
𝐹𝑡(𝜏) cumulative distribution function of random variable 𝑡 for a given 𝜏-value 
𝑁(𝑡𝑘) Number of failures following a Poisson process during time 𝑡 for component 𝑘 
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